Robert Skidelsky
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World Governance
Robert Skidelsky
Tuesday, March 20, 2007

Our starting point is the breakdown of the theory and to some extent the practice of state sovereignty under the impact of globalization. The doctrine of state sovereignty has been increasingly qualified. Sovereignty, it is said, is being undermined from above by the emergence of institutions of global governance, and from below by transnational movements and NGOs. The right to intervene coercively in what had hitherto been regarded as the domestic affairs of states is now being asserted for various contingencies, the most notable being when states sponsor terrorist groups or perpetuate or allow mass murder. The doctrine of state sovereignty is being modified in practice. The development of the hybrid European Union is one example; external military intervention in the affairs of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierre Leone are others. These interventions are only thinly connected with the UN Charter and international law, which are based on the Westphalian principle. The issue of course is what is replacing this Westphalian world. We are discussing, that is, the shape of the emerging political structure of the world. One of the candidates is loosely called ‘world governance’.
The growing use of the word ‘governance’ reflects an analytic unease about where the locus of power lies today. Talk of governance arises from proliferation of organizations which have a large influence on behaviour, which nevertheless lack the power of physical coercion. These may be inter-governmental organizations set up to perform specified tasks (IG0s) or non-governmental organizations (NG0s) set up by groups of people to promote shared goals. In 1900 there was one IGO: the Universal Postal Union. Today there are 240. The grand-daddy them is the United Nations, which itself spawns dozens of specialized agencies. The European Commission and the European Central Bank are the main examples of regional organizations. There are also thousands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) doing business, good works and lobbying for every conceivable cause within and across frontiers.
Generally speaking, there is nothing new about ‘governance’ except the inflated use of the word. The idea that there were no behaviour-influencing bodies ‘between’ governments and families (or markets) within states, or between ‘sovereign’ states in international affairs was always fictional. What is new about the 20th century is the spread of international organizations with delegated powers and the proliferation of non-government or sub-state organizations. The question then is: can one think of the government of the world in the 21st century coming from such bodies? Are elements of a world state being assembled in acronyms like the UN and its functional agencies, IMF,IBRD, WTO, UNHCR, UNICEF, etc. Is its General Assembly a putative ‘parliament of man’? Are NGOs an embryonic global ‘civil society’? What part do transnational corporations (TCs) play in world ‘governance’?
The most common explanation for the spread of ‘global governance’ is globalization. This has two aspects. Growing economic integration increases the need for national governments to coordinate policy. So they agree to set up supranational institutions ‘as a key modality for managing the decision-making requirements of a more integrated economic order’. (Kahler and Lake,1) The benefits they expect are those of: specialization (concentration of expertise in technical IG0s); managing externalities; easing collective decision making; resolving disputes over rule-governed behaviour; and locking in policies that might be overturned by future political challenge.
But the huge reduction in communication and information costs also stimulates transnational activity of all kinds, making possible a much thicker layer of cross-border business, NGOs, and informal networks than existed before.
Some scepticism about this explanation is in order. First, the main IG0s –the ones we have all heard of like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the EC - were set up before ‘globalization’.The UN High Commission for Refugees dates from 1951. Even the WTO, created in 1994,was planned fifty years before. Secondly, the first wave of globalization, which ended in 1914 - didn’t produce any supranational institutions. An important reason was that there were empires. And this probably provides the main reason for the growth of IG0s in the 20th century: they were substitutes for empire; or cynics would say, facades for covert imperial domination. The League of Nations and its successor the United Nations. were also designed to avoid the wars which imperial rivalry had brought about. The UN’s two specialized agencies, the IMF and World Bank (as well as the original blueprint for the WTO), were rooted in the problems of the 1930s. Why did you need an IMF? Because the gold standard mechanism for automatically adjusting nations’ balance of payments had broken down –either because Britain no longer managed it, as Kindleberger has argued or, more plausibly, because domestic societies had become less flexible, so more supranational ‘management’ was needed if depressions were to be avoided.
Global civil society also has a long history. Think of the great religions of the world. The Roman Catholic Church might be proposed as the earliest, certainly the most famous, international NGO.
IG0s:Agents of the State or Embryonic States?
For neo-realist students of IR, IG0s are simply agents of the states which set them up to do certain jobs. They have no autonomy because they have no coercive power –to raise taxes or quell disobedience. The European Commission is an agent of the states which make up to EU, a European civil service. Its authority is delegated. It would be naïve to expect governments to disarm themselves en masse and create international authorities to impose binding, proscriptive rules on their own behaviour. On this view, IGOs are new arenas for intergovernmental power struggles, with the important qualification that their setting up presupposes a disposition not to carry these struggles to the lengths of war. State can liquidate such organizations whenever they want to, or escape from their jurisdictions.
Neo-realists argue that the state retains enduring importance, in terms of Adam Smith’s three functions of defence, administration of justice, and provision of public goods. IGOs can’t replace the state’s core political function of protecting its citizens from violence, domestic or foreign, or its core economic function of safeguarding its people’s livelihood.
Neo-realists will also argue that these functions are inescapable from government’s formal accountability to its people. They talk about states as the units of action, but behind states (or governments) are voters to whom those governments are responsible through the electoral system..It is from the people, and them alone, that the power to coerce ultimately derives. IG0s are not accountable to the people, only to governments, ergo they can have no independent power.
Miles Kahler and David A Lake set out to test the prediction that globalization causes a migration of power to IGOs. They find that there has actually been a deficit of ‘supranationalism’ in the two decades of rapid globalization as compared to what was predicted. (The exception is the EU). They have two explanations. First, they say that the era of globalization has coincided with the spread of democracy, which has not been favourable to the migration of government to institutions beyond the nation-state. Secondly, they suggest that, insofar as governance has migrated from nation states it has been to transnational ‘networks and hierarchies’ not to IGOs. I will take up this second argument later.
[To sum up, realists and neo realists argue that without a substratum of hard power as the base of world order, ‘ the ‘softer’ elements of internat order (international law, international organization, the existence of shared values) wd be so many castles in the air’. (Hurrell, Forward]
The Bureaucratic Thesis
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore present a strong counter-argument. They treat IGOs as power accumulating bureaucracies. Those who saw the British political soap ‘Yes,Minister’-said to be Margaret Thatcher’s favourite TV program - understand perfectly well that formal power relations do not describe the reality. Ministers come and go, often before they have learnt much about their jobs: civil servants are their instructors. Bureaucracies usually wield more power than their political bosses because they control the instruments through which their masters must act and adapt them to their own purposes. The servant who controls his boss is an old literary conceit: in the novels of P.G.Wodehouse as in the soap ‘Upstairs, Downstairs’, the butler wields more power than his master, because he alone knows how to get things done, and how to present problems in ways that directs action to his preferred solutions.
Barnett and Finnemore claim that ‘international organizations are central actors on the stage of world politics’.(156) The notion that IGOs simply do what states want ignores the fact that they pursue their own agendas. They are active not passive, autonomous, but not omnipotent. They are not simply empty vessels into which states pour orders. In making these claims, Barnett and Finnemore don’t rely on public choice theorists like James Buchanan or William Niskanen who see bureaucrats as self-interested maximisers of their own utilities , but draw their inspiration from Max Weber and the theory of a bureaucratic culture which shapes the way officials see the world, and determines the way they respond to their mandates. Their expanded role today is due not just to the demands states put on them, but to the internal dynamics of bureaucracy, what they call ‘mission creep’.
It is their authority that gives bureaucracies autonomy.
Authority is a social construction. It is conferred. Authority helps an actor’s voice be heard, recognized, believed. The right to speak credibly is central to it. Because actors defer to authority they act in ways consistent with the directions laid down by that authority. Authority involves more than the ability to get people to do what they otherwise would not; it often consists of telling people what is the right thing to do.
Authority provides the social form and behavioural vocabulary of IGOs, snd supplies the social purposes IGOs pursue.(19-20)
Bureaucracy is the embodiment of rational-legal authority. In contrast to earlier forms of authority vested in leader, legitimate modern authority is invested in legalities, procedures, and rules and thus rendered impersonal.(21)
he authority of bureaucracies lies in their ability to present themselves as impersonal, neutral servants of others [ie without vested interests of their own], as ‘apolitical technocrats’.(22)
Three broad categories of authority undergird bureaucracies –delegation,morality, expertise.
Bureaucratic authority is delegated from states, it’s a grant of authority, authority on loan. ‘At some level, delegation creates autonomy precisely because being autonomous is the mandate’.(22)
Bureaucracy’s claim to moral authority is partly a claim to impartial representation of community’s interests as against states who serve their own interests.(23)
Specialized knowledge creates authority to make judgments and solve problems. What makes bureaucratic authority rational is its use of socially recognized relevant knowledge to carry out tasks. Bureaucrats value such knowledge because they believe it promotes social good. Professional norms, training, occupational cultures strongly shape the way experts view the world. They influence what problems are visible to staff and what range of solutions are entertained. Objective knowledge creates appearance of depoliticization.(24)
The authority of bureaucracies thus stems from their rational- legal character (reliance on impersonal rules), from their mandates, and from the expertise and moral claims that legitimate them. This autonomy is analysed under five heads:
1.The autonomy which comes from exploiting vague mandates - the so-called ‘zone of discretion’. Bureaucracies can transform grants of authority into workable doctrines, procedures, and ways of acting in the world.
2.The autonomy which comes from agenda setting. This gives them the ‘ability to frame problems, … and shame actors into compliance…’(16)
3.The autonomy which comes from information. ‘It is because bureaucrats have information and others do not, or because they can dictate what information other actors must collect and reveal, that they can increase their control over outcomes.(29)
4. The autonomy which comes from ‘the social construction of reality’.This is really at the centre of Barnett’s and Finnemore’s case. They talk of ‘the consistent tendency of I0s to create a world that subsequently licenses yet more intervention by I0s’.(17) Bureaucracies use their expertise to create what counts as knowledge, thus defining the scope for action and the type of action needed. The World Bank ‘tells us what constitutes poverty and what data are necessary to act on that policy problem’. IGOs determine what human rights are; they have altered the meaning of security from security against aggression to ‘human security’ against a much wider range of threats They thus help determine the kind of world that is to be governed and set the agenda for global governance.
5.The power which comes from creating norms. Barnett and Finnemore see them as ‘missionaries of our times aiming to define what constitutes acceptable state behaviour’. As they classify, promote and fix meanings and diffuse norms, they frequently legitimate and facilitate their expansion in the affairs of states and non-state actors. That ideology constitutes a form of power should nowadays not be too contentious. We have got beyond Stalin who asked ‘How many divisions has the Pope got?’
Our authors give the following example of ‘mission creep’ (34):. ‘International organizations have undertaken a range of peacebuilding operations as a way of trying to develop stable, legitimate states in the aftermath of violent conflicts. Establishing a civilian police force has become a routine part of these efforts.But a professional police establishment assumes a professional judiciary and a penal system where criminals can be tried and jailed. A professional judiciary, in turn, presupposes lawyers who can come to court and law schools to train them.Trained lawyers presuppose a code of law. The result is that what began as a relatively narrow technical intervention (training police) expands to a package of reforms aimed at transforming non-Western societies …into Western societies’.
27-8. IGO autonomy falls in following categories in ascending order of conflict with states:
1.By design -to further state interests
2.Where states are indifferent
3.By failure to act and thus carry out state demands through slowness or because they are contrary to its interests, procedures, mandates, expert knowledge.
4.By acting against state interests-contrary to preferences of weak states or frustrating the will of strong states by building alliances with publics, NGOs,other IGOs, other states.
5.By changing state perceptions or the normative environment to make them consistent with IGO preferences.
It’s a good case, but it’s not watertight. Barnett and Finnemore argue that IGOs create the knowledge and set the agendas which justify their activity. They are certainly very important in knowledge creation. But IGOs are only one actor among many engaged in ‘constructing’ reality. Though the IMF has economists, much of the economic knowledge on which it acts is provided by the economics profession.More broadly, NGOs, academics, media, politicians, unexpected events, and even the public are all busily creating problems to be solved. This limits the autonomy which can be claimed for the IGOs.
Moreover, the examples they give of the power-accreting achievements of IGOs –drawn from the UN and its technical agencies –are unconvincing. Let me spend a moment on the United Nations because this seems to me a clear example of an organization which has been kept firmly in its place –ie.,marginalized –by the great powers which set it up.
United Nations
After two world wars eminent thinkers and scholars and flirted with the idea of world government. Many supported the United Nations as a step towards it. The treaty setting it up in San Francisco in 1945 had some resemblance to the ‘social contract’ by which states were supposedly created. In fact what was created was a shadow state, full of state boxes waiting to be filled up. The Security Council could be thought of as a world executive, the General Assembly as its Parliament, the International Court of Justice as its judicial arm, the Secretariat as its civil service. A Military Staff Committee was set up to direct military operations; the the UN would have its own standby military forces and an array of UN bases, airfields and neval harbours all round the world to deter aggression. Colonial territories would be put under the control of a Trusteeship Council. Member-states signed up to ambitious social and economic agendas.
In fact the Charter was full of roadblocks inserted by the great powers to protect their interests, of which they made full use. With the League of Nations experience behind them, GB and France needed to embed superpowers in the new system, hence P5 veto on use of force in the Security Council. The Soviet Union used its veto most often in Cold War, often to stop admission of new members regarded as US lackeys; but between 85 and 90 there was no Soviet veto but 27 US vetoes, mainly to protect Israel. Other bits of Charter were designed to stop the UN from meddling in P5 matters: non-binding character of resolutions of General Assembly, purely voluntary recourse to arbitration,and P5 veto over changes to the Charter. The military structure was never activated, as the P5 chose to keep these instruments in their own hands. UN kept out of colonial matters by GB and France, who refused to transfer their colonies to Trusteeship Council.
The Suez Crisis of 1956 gave Hammarskjold the chance to invent ‘peacekeeping’. This entailed inserting lightly armed forces to monitor an already agreed ceasefire. The ‘blue helmets’ were only allowed in with the consent of both parties, they had to be impartial, and they were only allowed to use force in self-defence. The great powers found it useful to keep out of ‘peacekeeping missions’which were left to neutrals like Sweden and India, and were largely employed to supervise de-colonization.
The UN’s ‘soft agenda’ was left to the General Assembly. Preamble and article 55 pledges UN to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom and to employ ‘international machinery’ for this purpose. Founders believed that the greater success in addressing these issues, the less the need for force. Set up ECOSOC to promote this agenda. It can make decisions by majority vote, but decisions are not binding. Technical orgs like IMF, World Bank, later WTO only effective part of this empire of hot air, partly because they are specialized in economics, partly because they are controlled by P5. The New International Economic Order (NIEO) promoted by the developing country members (G77) in the 1970s, briefly put redistribution on the map, only to be swept away by the Reagan-Thatcher revolutions.
The veto in the Security Council meant that throughout Cold War, Security Council never invoked Article VII mandating collective response to aggression. The first Article VII war was Gulf War of 1991-2, though this was US, not UN, led. Everyone thought this would be start of Security Council working to ‘enforce peace’. But this type of inter-state war, for which Charter was designed, had become exceptional. As Paul Kennedy explains, the UN’s traditional function of acting v state aggression was overshadowed by ‘the sheer explosion of civil wars, ethnic and religious violence, massive violations of human rights, breakdowns of authority and humanitarian emergencies that occurred in the early 1990s’. The first effect was to toughen up peacekeeping. In 1993 US got a Security Council mandate for a large (30,000)American-ledpeace enforcement mission in Somalia. After 18 soldiers killed, US troops withdrawn. This reinforced US revulsion against using US troops for UN purposes. After the massacre at Srebrenica, a 50,000 NATO-led peacekeeping force was despatched with both US and Russian units. But the Somalia debacle prevented UN intervention in Rwanda: Europeans couldn’t, Americans wouldn’t. On top of this came Al Qaeda-led terrorism in 2001, and further confusion about the UN’s mission, and about the relationship between the different kinds of power.
This is a short potted history of the UN. In neo-realist terms, the great powers have retained all the essential instruments of coercion in their own hands. Provided the P5 could (a)stop UN from meddling in high security matters and (b)as long as they controlled its budget, the UN could do more or less what it wanted in other areas. The General Assembly’s meetings, resolutions, committees, conferences, conventions, targets, etc, are safety valves, useful for letting off steam.
In terms of Barnett and Finnemore: UN has accreted independent authority through inventing peace-keeping and the concept of ‘human security’. It has encroached on the ‘security’ sphere, by redefining security in terms of economic development, human rights, good governance This unites the ‘hard agenda’ of the Security Council with the ‘soft agenda’ of General Assembly. It has succeeded in selling this enlarged security agenda to world leaders like Blair. But the relationship between ‘peacekeeing’, ‘peace enforcement’, and ‘state building’ hasn’t been worked out.
Despite the spread of globalization, it is hard not to agree that the moral and political framework conditions for world government are nonexistent and likely to be so for the foreseeable future. The key attachment to the civitas is and will remain at national level. This has been reinforcement by growth of democracy and nationalism and concentration of power at state level. Easier to conceive of ‘world government’ in pre-national state days, when power was heavily dispersed within states, and frontiers were much more porous.
One important qualification. The hierarchy of states is a fact of life which has survived the demise of formal imperialism.In superpower era, some ‘flattening’ of hierarchy took place, because of the preponderance of USA and Soviet Union. In the ‘unipolar moment’ this flattening seemed likely to be carried even further. But it has not turned out like that, because globalization is making the world more multipolar. This is an inescapable consequence of ‘ catch-up’. Catch-up restores hierarchy by decreasing the power gap between the major centres while widening it between them and the rest. It is obvious that some states have a lot more power in the system than others. Thus the migration to a higher level of decision-making, supposedly entailed by globalization, may be migration not from national states to IG0s but from small states to big states.The notion of ‘clubs’ may give us a better idea of how international governance is developing than that of IG0s with delegated powers like the UN and WT0. G8 is one example. NAT0 is another. The EU is largely a Franco-German club, and its club aspect would be even more apparent if GB joined.
This conclusion brings us back to the point about the migration of power to hierarchies and networks, which I now want to take up.
Hierarchy defined as a relationship in which one actor possesses authority over some domain of another’s actions. Perhaps the best illustration of hierarchy in today’s international economy is dollarization, the ‘hardest’ of exchange rate pegs, in which one country adopts the currency of another as its own. Dollarized economy accepts the monetary authority of the country with the dominant currency.
In the political domain there are two variants: extra-territoriality recalls the imperialist era when dominant powers asserted authority over their nationals within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, e.g. China.
Today extraterritoriality is deployed by dominant states as a way of reasserting regulatory control over actors who are escaping from or undermining their national regulatory regimes. Extends the reach of the state into other jurisdictions. It is not a claim of authority over states, but of individuals, or corporations which reside in other states. The weaker state has three responses: block the claims, accommodate existence of conflicting rules within its jurisdiction or change its legislation to accommodate the dominant state.
The US has used extra-territoriality in various environmental cases. In Trail Smelter case (Pakootas v Tech Cominco) US plaintiffs tried to apply US environmental law against Canadian firm operating solely in Canada for environmental externalities in US. Many in Canada see this as ‘environmental imperialism’. Today elite club of states dictating the allowable regulatory policies for less dominant ones. Emulation may disguise hierarchical relations in which dominant power imposes its regulatory policies through use of incentives or sanctions: ‘emulation or else’. Membership conditionality for joining EU. This differs from free emulation by being consistently uni-directional, with implicit threat of sanctions.
Central bank cooperation and public-private network that sustained it dates from 1st era of globalisation and was maintained in 1920s. Central bankers turned back to cooperation in 1970s with major bank failures in early 1970s. Banks slipping out of national regulation. Initial response: Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at BIS. BIS invented itself after war as a valuable instrument inliberalizing postwar EPU. And useful central bankers’ club. BCBS seems a response to externalities. But BIS didn’t get any new powers. Purpose was to extend national banking regulation to offshore sites. So BIS as ‘central node in a structure of networked governance in financial regulation’.
By taking into account the persistence of hierarchy and the existence of powerful networks, one can say that global governance includes more supranational authority than is captured in delegation of authority to formal IGOs.
Global Civil Society
This is another of the blurred terms. Like the system of states, or social systems within states, global civil society is hierarchical. At the top end are TCs and the most powerful NGOs. The distinction is usually been the business and the political branches of global civil society. At the top, GCS is very close to the system of states, and for many neo-realists, as well as Marxists, the biggest actors in this universe are in effect agents of states or delegated international organizations. For others they are part of a seamless web of governance stretching from states to world population.
Public-Private and private networks were a familiar part of international governance before 1945. In some respects IGOs were set up to replace them. But they also included NGOs. In the dynastic era , the main networks were constituted by the cousinhood of sovereigns and diplomatic circuits. One can think of European missionary bodies as early examples of ideological NGOs, aiming to convert the heathen, in much the same spirit as their contemporary successors press development projects on African and Latin American peasants: the economist Jeffrey Sachs is typical of the missionary type.
Business life spread through networks. As early as 1712, the English journal the Spectator could write:
They [Jews] are so disseminated through all the trading Parts of the World, that they are become the Instruments by which the most distant Nations converse with each other and by which mankind are knit together…. They are like the pegs and nails in a great building, which, though they are little valued in themselves, are absolutely necessary to keep the whole frame together.
The same could be said, though less universally, about Armenians, Chinese, and Indians. Family networks, dispersed round the world, helped to supply international credit facilities before the formal legal and institutional structures were put into place. They still do today, in many of the emerging markets. In the development of the international economy, trust comes before law, and kinship before state. The Rothschilds are the most famous 19th century example, and both Lenin and Hitler took them as paradigmatic of the way finance manipulates governments.
This is the context for viewing the passions aroused by multinational corporations today.
International Business
TCs are private and are therefore part of global civil society. But they are also very powerful.
The benign view sees them as Agents of liberalization: part of transfer of technology, efficient allocation of capital? Or are they
agents of imperialism: monopoly capitalism, states underwrite them.The power of the TC’s is a central part of the anti-globalization argument.. 59. Anti-globalists argue that ‘these forces of globalisation have weakened and even overwhelmed the authority of nat governments, giving way to the rising power of nongovernmental actors, particularly multinational enterprises’. MNCs with flexible and footloose production across globe are in driving seat and are dethroning political authority of governments. Main target, Multilateral Agreement on Investments (1998) removes old obligations on TCs. But this hasn’t been agreed.
Globalization much exaggerated. Still less integrated than before 1914. Nation states remain key units. Great deal of economic activity remains intrinsically domestic not international.No more than the Rothschilds in the 19th century have TCs come close to usurping the political authority of the state’.
Political NGOs
In her book Global Civil Society; An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor lists four versions of global civil society, including religious and racial fanaticism. ‘In place of vertical territorial-based forms of civil society, we are witnessing the emergence of horizontal transnational global networks, both civil and uncivil’. The main point is that whether global society evolves in pacific/democratic or fanatical/violent forms it is obliterating the territorial division of the world into separate statesm, and is thus removing tradition war and war-making, which is violence between territorially-based states. If states are metamorphosing into something else, preaceful or violent, war no longer exists. Law enforcement and law breaking may still exist but to use the language of war to describe them is to miss the significance of what is happening.
That war is on its way out is shown by phrases like ‘network warfare’, ‘spectacle warfare’, and ‘neomodern wars’. The first two are not ‘real wars’, the third will disappear as well when the states fighting them find they cannot win.
So what is replacing the Westphalian system? To say that the Westphalian system is going, or has gone, is not to say that state sovereignty has become redundant. One possibility, as we have seen, is that the classical balance of power is replaced by a hierarchy of states, in which sovereignty is highly unequally divided in the system: with the United States as the most –perhaps the only fully-independent state, and sovereignty receding as one moves down the ladded till it virtually disappears at the bottom. Or to change the image: there is now one big hammer, a number of smaller hammers, and the rest of the world is anvil.
Secondly, Kaldor treats something she calls the ‘international community’ as an independent actor: ‘the term humanitarian intervention perhaps needs to be reconceptualized as international presence in conflict-prone areas’. This usage ignores the fact that the decisive actors in any intervention –thosealone able to commit troops and resources to whatever purpose –are states. They may be coalitions of states, they may act under a UN mandate, but they are states nevertheless. This reflects the fact that these is no world government, no legal or moral authority to which a state is bound to submit.
Thus it is hard to agree that ‘global civil society’ is on the way to replacing the system of states, or subjecting it to a decisive restraint.
Normative Issues
(1)Kant’s opposition to world government as tyranny.
(2)Bureaucracy rampant suggests Weber’s iron cage of bondage’. One consistent finding is that IGOs tend to expand. This raises prospect of ever more bureaucratised world, with IGOs becoming ever more involved in shaping our daily lives. At global level we may face an undemocratic liberalism.
(3)Nation-state as value.
Utilitarians like Peter Singer (One World) regard nations simply as branches of govt which should be measured by their contribution to world utility.Against this we may set Adam Smith ‘We do not love our country merely as part of the great society of mankind: we love it for its own sake an independently of such considerations’.(q Sally,58)
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